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As scholars begin to assess the consequences of the Middle East
crisis of 1990, they will probably conclude that Saddam Hussein's
military invasion and occupation of Kuwait resulted in a surprising
and welcome demonstration of globil consensus at the United Na-
tions. By an ironic twist of fate, the President of Iraq contributed to
the development of what may in future be considered the U.N.'s fin-
est hour as the United Nations condemned the Iraqi invasion and
put in place a trade embargo against Iraq. Internationalist aspira-
tions which created the world organization in 1945 seemed finally to
be on the road to fulfillment in 1990. The prevailing sense of disap-
pointment with the United Nations was replaced with a renewal of
hope for future global cooperation.
The fact that most nations of the world agree that Hussein's
action in occupying a neighboring independent State and annexing it
was morally wrong; the fact that, at the time of writing, most coun-
tries have agreed to abide by the trade embargo; the fact that the
overwhelming American presence in Saudi Arabia is balanced by
Middle Eastern contingents from nations like Egypt, all highlight a
near universal opposition to the deprivation of the rights of Kuwaiti
citizens and an international determination to protect the rights of
the Saudi Arabians. Naturally, one cannot overlook the significance
of the oil issue as one motivator of this resounding international con-
sensus. However, the existence of practical economic considerations
in no way diminishes the humanitarian nature of the global response.
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That such universality has been demonstrated at the United
Nations is largely due to the dramatic changes Gorbachev has initi-
ated in the foreign policy of the U.S.S.R. The continuation of such
harmony could in time affect every sphere of U.N. activity and im-
pact most directly on the realm of human rights. The decision by
First, Second and Third Worlds not to countenance the disappear-
ance of Kuwait as a nation is an event of major significance in global
politics. The ramifications are likely to be far-reaching. It is an event
which will undoubtedly figure in the deliberations of political scien-
tists, historians and international lawyers, particularly those whose
interests lie in the field of human rights.
Time alone will tell whether the appearance of what the media
is labelling "The New International Order" will have a positive im-
pact on human rights and resolve many of the problems which have
bedevilled the implementation of rights thus far.
Writing before Saddam Hussein's brutal invasion, Alison
Dundes Renteln echoes the doubts of a number of scholars in the
field of human rights. The entire issue of human rights has been
plagued by controversies about the nature of these rights, their
source, their justification, their classification, their origin and their
application, to name only a few aspects of the continuing debate.
Like other scholars, Renteln attempts to deal with the fundamental
issue of universality in an apparent effort to achieve the kind of in-
ternational commitment to the implementation of human rights that
we have witnessed recently with respect to the concept of a nation's
right to exist.
Renteln believes that "... universal human rights are possible
. . ." but is ". . . concerned about the extent to which the concept
of human rights is embraced worldwide."' In view of the depreda-
tions of death squads in Latin America; the use of chemical warfare
against the Kurdish minority in Iraq; the frightening genocide by Pol
Pot and the Khmer Rouge against Cambodian civilians and the 1989
massacre of students in Tiananmen Square, Beijing by the Chinese
Government, Renteln's concerns are more than justified. However,
the global condemnation of such actions by the media and public
opinion underscores the fact that in the second half of this century, a
greater sense of awareness (because of communications technology)
has led to the emergence and expression of a nearly universal moral
conscience in some situations. That this feeling has not yet pene-
trated to the power centers of a number of governments cannot di-
minish its value as a possible inspiration for greater public commit-
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ment to human rights in the future.
This is why the scholarly debate about the nature, origin and
relevance of human rights has, to a considerable extent, been super-
seded by the "man in the street" demonstrating for freedom in East
Germany, democracy in China and equal rights in India. While
human rights have not yet been universally implemented, one should
not underestimate the extent to which they have been globally
accepted.
Renteln's interest in anthropology makes her wary about:
• ..the fallacy common to many writings on human rights,
namely the presumption of universality. What typifies this way
of thinking is the belief that human rights exist independent of
culture, ideology, and value systems . . .This is a peculiar form
of ethnocentrism insofar as western ideas are presumed to be
ubiquitous.'
Some writers go so far as to deny the existence of a non-West-
ern concept of human rights. Jack Donnelly argues that "[m]ost
non-Western cultural and political traditions, like the premodern
West, lacked not only the practice of human rights but also the very
concept."4 Nevertheless, Donnelly insists that "although they are
Western in origin and thus historically particular . . . human rights
are of near universal contemporary relevance. '
Renteln counters by stating that ". . . it is futile and perhaps
even counterproductive merely to assert the existence of universal
human rights in the face of cultural diversity."
Any attempt to deal with this crucial issue of universality has to
recognize some significant factors. Though Afro-Asian nations do
not share the European historical tradition of the Enlightenment, a
considerable number of educated persons in those countries have
been exposed to and influenced by the ideas and ideology of the
West as well as by their own ancient traditions, and have attempted
to combine the best of both worlds. One of the few positive conse-
quences of the era of European imperialism was in the cultural and
philosophic exchange of ideas which resulted from the period of
Western domination. Though the economic exploitation resulted in
anti-Western national movements, the ideological basis of many of
these struggles for freedom lay in "Western" ideas of nationalism,
democracy and freedom combined with indigenous ideas of patriot-
ism and social responsibility. In the very process of denying the va-
lidity of European colonial rule, the Afro-Asian nationalists demon-
3. Id. at 12.
4. J. DONNELLY, UNIVERSAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 50 (1989).
5. Id.
6. A. RENTELN, supra note 1, at 13.
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strated their commitment to European political philosophy. For
example, the adoption of the British parliamentary system by the
Government of India proves the desire of the former Indian freedom
fighters to take what they considered to be the best ideas of the West
and give them an indigenous relevance. Parliamentary government in
India may be volatile and on occasion fragile, but, after more than
four decades, it has acquired characteristically Indian features and
will undoubtedly be perceived in future years as part of an emerging
Indian political tradition. In a very real sense, then, a foreign im-
plant has acquired an indigenous relevance.
With the global interest in democracy today, it is possible that
given time, human rights could similarly acquire an inherent, na-
tional significance in much of the Third World, whatever the origin
of these ideas. It is also probable that while scholars may continue to
argue over the universality or non-universality of human rights, peo-
ple the world over, given an understanding of the importance of
these concepts in their everyday lives, may seize on these ideas and
adopt and perhaps adapt them to their own range of experience. As
James Hsiung aptly comments: "Human rights, however defined,
seem to have a universal acceptance, even nominally by those who
violate them. Like motherhood and apple pie, who could reject
them?" 7 The absence of a historical tradition of Enlightenment ideas
is not necessarily a bar to modern commitment by any nation to
these concepts.
One can only support Renteln's plea that "[t]o avoid the charge
of cultural imperialism, we must seek cross-cultural support for in-
ternational human rights standards."'8 It is Renteln's hope that "uni-
versally embraced moral" principles can be discovered which would
create a global basis for the adoption and implementation of human
rights." Given the variety of ethical and religious systems which
flourish on this planet, this task could prove quite a challenge. I
would suggest that a broadening of the definition of certain rights
might be a somewhat easier exercise. The charge of cultural imperi-
alism has arisen because of the apparent insistence of some Western
scholars and human rights advocates on a very restrictive definition
which takes little account of a cultural diversity. This definitional
dilemma has also been partly responsible for the wrangle over civil,
political, economic and social rights as well as the now familiar
generational dispute between categories of rights. A little more ac-
commodation of differences and less rigidity of positions could con-
7. HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST ASIA 3 (J. Hsiung, ed. 1985) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS IN
EAST AIA].
8. A. RENTELN, supra note 1, at 15.
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ceivably lead to greater appreciation, adoption and implementation
of the system globally. An international debate which seeks compro-
mise and consensus and responds to cultural differences will surely
accomplish more than continuous underlining of familiar positions.
James Hsiung has proposed a blueprint which takes into account the
great historical cultural tradition of East Asia. According to Hsiung,
a definition of human rights would include the following:
a) Human rights have "human" origins...
b) Since their origins are human and derived from a con-
sensus among fellow humans to answer the needs of all, the
rights of individuals do not outweigh those of society . . .They
are human "rights" only if they do not spawn human "wrongs"
against society. 10
Hsiung continues his blueprint by emphasizing the significance of
social and economic rights along with political rights. He justifies
this position by asserting that "[t]o a person whose country does not
offer its population socio-economic well-being, a modicum of tran-
quility and security within its borders, and a minimum measure of
respect abroad, a hundred individual liberties would not mean very
much."' 1 Whether or not one agrees with his suggestions, the possi-
bility of making human rights more than a Western system will un-
doubtedly be a major challenge of the 1990s. Should the United Na-
tions continue to act with effectiveness in dealing with international
problems, its contributions to this process could be very important
for the fulfillment of human rights.
While perceptions and opinions as well as definitions of human
rights may vary from one region to the next, the element which is
likely to be most understanding of and tolerant toward such ideas is
to be found among the educated members of any society, particu-
larly those persons who have travelled and are acutely aware of
world developments. While one hesitates to generalize and while
there are some exceptions, this so-called "elite," in governing a coun-
try, manning its legal and judicial system, staffing its senior bureau-
cracy and educating its youth can play a significant role in creating
public awareness about human rights. Unfortunately, in the thinking
of some scholars, including Renteln, the "elite" (not clearly defined)
is perceived as not being in step with "... the rest of the citizenry
S. ., While this may be true in some instances, the "elite" plays
the same leading role in Western countries as it does in any Afro-
Asian nation. One ought not to be too dismissive concerning the
10. HUMAN RIGHTS IN EAST AsIA, supra note 7, at 22-23.
11. Id. at 23.
12. A. RENTELN, supra note 1, at 10.
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opinions of the so-called "elite." While the search for universal prin-
ciples among remote tribal people is a valid, fascinating intellectual
exercise, it is usually mainstream thinking (led by the "elite") which
prevails in any nation.
Therefore, the search for familiar moral values among exotic
peoples should not detract us from the easier search for such princi-
ples in the modernized sector of Afro-Asian societies. It will cer-
tainly be simpler to find persons familiar with and receptive to the
concept of human rights in modern urban centers than in remote
tribal villages in the Third World. Nor can the urban Asian be
deemed less representative of indigenous values simply because he
has acquired modern ways of speech or dress or loves electronic gad-
getry. The Western advocates of human rights could fare better in
the Third World by conceding that all civilizations are a constantly
evolving blend of East and West. Past cliches about East being East
and West being West are now largely obsolete. The greater sense of
tolerance which Eastern religions have inculcated in their devotees
have made Asians particularly adept and judicious at creating an
individual rapprochement between the Eastern and Western ways of
life. The desire to assimilate modern technology is pervasive in some
ancient societies. The citizen of India who prays in his temple ac-
cording to traditions formulated thousands of years ago and then
goes home and watches his favorite show on television feels no
qualms that he is betraying his heritage by subscribing to modern
ideas. The very thought would amuse him. Such a mindset of toler-
ance can only be an asset for the widespread acceptance of human
rights.
I also wonder whether Renteln's concerns about "elites" are jus-
tified. Given the diversity in some countries like India, it would be
virtually impossible to find "representative" or "average" Indian.
Referring to international forums, Renteln asks:
Do the elites who purport to represent the positions of their
nationals do so accurately? Do indigenous perceptions of human
rights correspond to the viewpoints expressed by elites in the
context of U.N. debates? If not, then the standard argument
advanced by international lawyers, namely that ratification of
international instruments indicates universal acceptance of the
norms, is false . . . . It remains to be seen how many human
rights are actually consistent with the diverse value systems
across the globe.18
The questions she asks about "elites" are probably unanswerable.
There is no doubt that Renteln is acutely sensitive to the sensi-
13. Id. at 38.
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bilities of foreign cultures. She is concerned to demonstrate that
duty-based social systems could still be said to hold a concept of
rights,14 a position rejected by Donnelly. Donnelly believes that:
To accommodate the non-Western approaches . .. we
would have to establish an order in which an extensive set of
social rights and duties takes priority over individual rights. In
such circumstances, human rights will be, at best, largely a for-
mality in practice. 15
Renteln contests this idea by stating:
If. . . the members of a given society have a duty to take
care of the elderly, then the elderly could be said to have a right
to proper care. The point is that just because the rubric of some
peoples is not that of rights does not mean that human rights
cannot be universal.16
One way to determine whether human rights have universal rel-
evance is by conducting serious, systematic research into the cultural
systems of a number of societies. Such studies, if done via the
method of comparison, might yield significant results for the estab-
lishment of global consensus on the existence of human rights. The
difficulty would be to find the precise group or groups to study and to
determine whether the selected group can be said to "represent" the
society in question. If national practices appear to be similar to, or at
least within the framework of the existing international formulations
on human rights, that too would contribute to the search for univer-
sals. Such literature is already emerging. Renteln presents a very
interesting, albeit brief example of comparative research in her study
of retribution tied to proportionality.
There are many problems involved in conducting such research.
As Renteln admits, ". . . it is not obvious which data can provide a
means to discovering the 'true' moral standards of a society. ' 17 Once
again, she expresses her anxiety about the "elites." "Consulting ju-
risprudential and theological texts will surely paint a picture of
moral standards, but they may be only the ideals of the elites; what
we are after are native moral categories."1 8 It is really not clear why
these "elites" are dismissed as being nonrepresentative particularly
as their influence on the practices of society are likely to be even
more pervasive in tradition-bound cultural systems.
The other problem lies in the numbers game. How many socie-
ties have to subscribe to a principle in order for it to acquire valid
14. Id. at 45.
15. J. DONNELLY, supra note 4, at 58.
16. A. RENTELN, supra note 1, at 12.
17. Id. at 89.
18. Id.
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universal status? Renteln makes it clear that, ". . . a simple major-
ity rule principle operating in the international system is not accept-
able .-*" However, she also states:
That there may be evidence that a majority of countries
and peoples are committed to a particular moral standard might
indicate their willingness to accept a human-rights standard
which is based on the norm. It would be quite significant if there
should happen to be convergence among the many moral sys-
tems in the world. Such unanimity might provide a stronger
foundation for human rights.2 0
Another problem inherent in such research concerns the ines-
capable fact that "the measuring tools are culture-bound. ' 21 The
lack of a widely accepted, truly objective method for evaluation and
the probable impossibility of creating a system free of cultural bias
for rating human rights have been emphasized by some scholars.
Again, while academics may feel acutely uncomfortable about such
limitations, it has to be remembered that the "man in the street" in
any society can perceive and react against injustice, discrimination
and deprivation of the basis of his own cultural mindset untrammel-
led by the qualms about precision and objectivity which affect schol-
ars. When Tibetans carry placards proclaiming "Long Live Dalai
Lama" and "We Want Human Rights"2 2 it is obvious that the as-
similation of human rights may well be easier than many intellectu-
als in the West believe. Much remains to be done, however, particu-
larly in rigorously fundamentalist societies.
Renteln believes that insofar as the intellectual debate is
concerned,
• . . to date negligible progress has been made in the direc-
tion of establishing that human rights are universal or even that
certain moral principles are widely shared. The studies raise im-
portant questions, indicate the need for empirical data, and re-
flect a feeling of dissatisfaction with the present state of human
rights.2"
Renteln's study of retribution tied to proportionality is very in-
teresting for the insight it offers into the customs of numerous socie-
ties. More emphasis on the connection and linkage to the main
themes of the book would have been welcomed.
Renteln asserts: "Some may ask what the precise relationship is
19. Id. at 90.
20. Id. at 90-91.
21. Id. at 91.
22. R. CLAUDE & B. WESTON, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY 1 (1989).
23. A. RENTELN, supra note 1, at 95.
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between principles and rights. There is no necessary connection."'"
She feels that the value of comparative research lies in the fact that
". .. where it is possible to demonstrate acceptance of a moral prin-
ciple or value by all cultures, it will be feasible to erect human-rights
standards. The reality of universality depends on marshaling cross-
cultural data."25 It is to be hoped that she will further develop this
aspect of her work in future books.
She concludes this well-written and thought-provoking book by
urging that ". . the search for cross-cultural universals must be
realistic." '26 One can only endorse her view that ". . . this approach
offers the possibility of grounding international human rights in real-
ity instead of naturalistic abstractions."2 " Given the inherent com-
plexity of the situation, a pattern of complexity referred to earlier in
this article, Renteln's search for a basis in reality should be a most
interesting challenge.
The most important consequence of such research is highlighted
by Renteln when she asserts:
The United Nations ...can more readily and justifiably
criticize the behavior of other nations if truly universal stan-
dards exist. Instead of chastising nations for violating standards
which they have not ratified or which they have but do not care
about, the United Nations could condemn them for ignoring
their own standards. 28
Given the revitalization of the United Nations in the summer of
1990, there is very real possibility that it may be able to take more
effective action against human rights violators in future. The world
now has an opportunity to demonstrate and establish the relevance
and validity of the United Nations. Whether the U.N. will fulfill
present hopes, whether the Powers will, for once, allow it to act ef-
fectively and implement the aims of internationalism remains to be
seen. The tragic, violent Gulf Crisis of 1990 has ironically opened a
window of opportunity for the United Nations. Human rights advo-
cates the world over can only wait and keep their fingers crossed.
24. Id. at 135.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 137.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 139.
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